The current proposal reverts Sabah and Sarawak’s perceived status change, clarifying that the Federation is comprised of two groupings – one encompassing the states in Peninsular Malaysia and the other comprising the two territories of Sabah and Sarawak. One Member of Parliament from the Peninsula argued that the amendment would remove the impression that Sabah and Sarawak were “foreign” countries in Malaysia the Chief Minister of Sarawak supported the removal of the word ‘Borneo’, which historically also includes Indonesian provinces, and expressed his desire for a unified judiciary with no division between the Malayan and Borneo courts. The 1976 amendment was justified as necessary to create equality among states and ensure further unity within the federation, and received overwhelming support in the federal legislature, including the acquiescence of members of Parliament from Sabah and Sarawak. This effectively placed Sabah and Sarawak on equal footing with the other states in the Federation. The current version of Article 1(2) was the product of a further constitutional amendment in 1976 and lists all states within the federation under a single category in alphabetical order. This version was amended when Singapore became an independent state in 1965. The proposed amended Article 1(2) would specify that “he States of the Federation shall be (a) the States of Malaya … and (b) the Borneo States, namely Sabah and Sarawak.” It bears echoes of an earlier version of this article, which had listed the Federation as comprising three groupings: (a) the eleven states in Peninsular Malaysia that constituted the former Federation of Malaya (1948-1963) (b) the Borneo States, namely Sabah and Sarawak and (c) the State of Singapore. The first amendment concerns Article 1(2).
The first three proposed amendments are symbolically important, though their legal significance remains unclear. As further discussed below, the proportion of seats has also become a point of contention for Sabah and Sarawak.Ĭoequal Status of Sabah and Sarawak to the Peninsula With a weakened central government, Sabah and Sarawak’s leverage is particularly strong since, amidst a fragmented political party landscape, they have taken on the position of ‘kingmaker’ with approximately 25% of the seats in the federal legislature. I argued in 2018 that the momentous results of Malaysia’s 14th General Election, where the Barisan Nasional alliance (“BN”) lost control of the federal government for the first time since Malaysia’s independence, would result in further political diffusion, giving rise, inter alia, to opportunities to reconsider the division of power between the Malaysian federal government and the states of Sabah and Sarawak. This article examines the symbolic and legal significance of the proposed amendments, contextualized in a brief history of the treatment of Sabah and Sarawak within the Federation as well as the current political conditions in Malaysia. The Federation was left with the Malayan states as well as Sabah and Sarawak after Singapore seceded by mutual agreement in 1965. MA63 was a treaty for the creation of the Federation of Malaysia by combining the states in the Federation of Malaya with North Borneo (which became Sabah), Sarawak, and Singapore.
On 3 November 2021, the Malaysian government tabled four constitutional amendments relating to Sabah and Sarawak, which purport to realize the terms agreed to under the Malaysian Agreement 1963 (MA63). If passed, these constitutional amendments are hopeful first steps towards greater devolution, more equitable wealth distribution, and democratic empowerment of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak – writes Professor Jaclyn L Neo While the amendments concerning the coequal status of Sabah and Sarawak to the Peninsula may be more symbolically than legally significant, the fourth, allowing Sarawak state law to define who is a “native”, could have significant economic and political consequences.
Four proposed constitutional amendments in Malaysia seek to restore the status of Sabah and Sarawak within the Malaysian constitutional order, and reflect both the increased leverage of the states and the pressure from secessionist voices.
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